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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE MERIDIAN SCHOOL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
BONITA HUGHES, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
i Case No. 940074-CA 
Priority 15 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in the Utah Court of Appeals is conferred by 
virtue of Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Was the trial court's granting of Defendant's (Hughes') Motion 
for Summary Judgment an error in law? The standard of review is 
"correction of error." Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 
813 P.2d 1169, 1171 (Utah 1991). 
Was the trial court's application of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure an error in law? The standard of review is "to 
review the evidence in a light most favorable to the losing party." 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE RULE 
The rule which is believed to be determinative in this case is 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Addendum 
Exhibit "A"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final Order granting Defendant-
Appellee's (Hughes') Motion for Summary Judgment, rendered in the 
Fourth Circuit Court of the State of Utah on January 4, 1994. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff-Appellant (Meridian) filed a Complaint on June 3, 
1992, alleging breach of a written contract. (R. 2). Defendant-
Appellee (Hughes) filed an Answer on June 24, 1992f wherein she 
asserted unconscionability, lack of mutuality, rescission, waiver, 
and estoppel. (R. 8). 
A trial date was set for March 25, 1993, but was stricken with 
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instructions for both parties to submit motions for summary 
judgment. (R. 53). 
Hughes filed her Motion on April 15, 1993, (R. 83), and 
Meridian filed its Motion on April 15, 1993, (R. 128). 
Meridian filed its reply on April 29, 1993, (R. 143), and 
Hughes filed her reply on May 19, 1993, (R. 163). 
The lower court issues its ruling on August 26, 1993, (R. 
173), and enters its order based thereon on January 4, 1994, (R. 
175). 
C. DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court, while acknowledging that the matter was not 
before the court following trial, nevertheless found: 
1. No material conflict of facts; 
2. The interpretation of communications 
between the parties creates a conflict; 
3. Plaintiffs (Meridian/s) burden is 
"preponderance of the evidence"; 
4• Defendant's (Hughes') interpretation of 
the communications is reasonable. 
Accordingly, the trial court granted Hughes' Motion and 
dismissed Meridian's Complaint. (See Addendum Exhibit "B"). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Hughes executed a private school enrollment contract with 
Meridian on or about February 8, 1991. (See Addendum Exhibit "C" 
and R. 113). 
Sometime thereafter, Hughes determined not to enroll her child 
in school. (R. 108). 
The school registrar, Gayle Wells, advised Hughes to write to 
the school board in order to request permission to withdraw from 
the school. (R. 71). 
Hughes sent a written request to withdraw on or about July 31, 
1991. (R. 108). 
Meridian through its board of trustees, rejected the requests 
of the Defendant to withdraw her child from school. (R. 106). 
On October 4, 1991, Hughes verbally appealed to Kevin Clyde, 
the headmaster of the school, to reconsider the board's decision. 
(R. 119 and 104). 
On October 17, 1991, the board of trustees again advised 
Hughes of the requirement that she fulfill her contractual 
obligations to the school. (R. 97). 
On October 21, 1991, Hughes suggested by letter that she would 
be willing to enroll her child in school. (R. 95). 
On October 24, 1991, the board of trustees rejected the 
request of Hughes to pro-rate tuition for her child, Sarah. 
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(R. 92). 
On October 28 , 1991, Hughes stated that the enrollment of her 
child was conditional upon arriving at a settlement with the board 
of trustees. (R. 90). 
By letter dated November 14, 1991, Hughes was again notified 
of her obligation under the contract. (R. 88). 
Hughes refused to enroll her child in school and failed to pay 
the tuition, all to Meridian's damage in the sum of $1,700 plus 
interest thereon, attorney's fees, and court costs. (R. 119). 
Meridian filed a Complaint against Hughes on April 15, 1992, 
(Civil No. 920-1847). (R. 2). 
By its Minute Entry dated March 24, 1993, Judge E. Patrick 
McGuire, Circuit Court Judge, directed both parties to submit 
motions for summary judgment. (R. 53). 
On January 4, 1994, the Circuit Court dismissed Meridian's 
Complaint. (R. 171 and 175). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's granting of Hughes' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was in error as a matter of law because genuine issues of 
material fact exist. 
The trial court's application of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
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Civil Procedure was in error as a matter of law because, when 
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Meridian, 
any material difference in the parties version of the facts 
precludes summary judgment• 
ARGUMENT 
I* The trial court's granting of Hughes' Motion for Summary 
Judgment was in error as a matter of law because genuine issues of 
material fact exist. 
This Court recently stated: 
Recognizing that the party adversely affected 
by the summary judgment has not had an 
opportunity for trial, the court views the 
facts in the light most favorable to that 
party. Estate Landscape v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 793 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1990). 
The Court further stated: 
...any material difference in the parties 
versions of the facts will preclude summary 
judgment. Estate Landscape v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 793 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1990). 
More recently, the Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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56(c) : Allen V. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1309 
(Utah 1990). 
In reviewing the trial court's ruling we 
accept the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Because 
summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law, we may reconsider the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Farmer's New Word Life Insurance 
Company v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 
(Utah 1999) and Winnager v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
The Court further stated in the Winnaqer case: 
It is not difficult to see how the trial court 
was tempted to "weigh" these competing 
interpretations to determine what effect to 
give this agreement. Unfortunately, weighing 
evidence is proper only when making Findings 
of Fact, not when determining questions of law 
in interpreting a contract on a motion for 
summary judgment. 
In the instant case, the following material facts are 
disputed: 
1. Meridian disputes the facts contained in paragraph 
6 of Hughes' Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 81), and 
affirmatively asserts in paragraph 2 of Meridian's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities (R. 126), Exhibit "B" (R. 110), and 
paragraph 2 of the Affidavit of Gayle Wells (R. 121), that a 
conversation was held on July 31, 1991, and that Hughes was 
advised to obtain permission to withdraw by writing to the 
school board. 
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2. Meridian disputes the facts contained in paragraph 
8 of Hughes' Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 81), and 
affirmatively asserts in paragraph 2 of Meridian's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities (R. 126), and paragraph 2 and 3 of 
the Affidavit of Gayle Wells (R. 121, 120), and in Exhibit "B" 
(R. 110), that Wells did not have the authority to waive 
tuition, and that a written request to the school board was 
advised in order to obtain permission to withdraw. 
3. Meridian disputes the facts contained in paragraph 
10 of Hughes' Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 80), 
and affirmatively asserts in paragraph 1 of Meridian's Reply 
(R. 143), and in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Affidavit of Suzan 
Handford (R. 138), that registration materials were sent to 
Hughes on or about August 15, 1991. 
The clear and simple language of the enrollment 
contract requires that, "written notice of cancellation" occur 
before July 1, 1991. It further states, "the obligation...to 
pay tuition and fees for the entire school year is 
unconditional and irrevocable after July 1, 1991..." 
When viewing the facts in a light most favorable to 
Meridian, a valid contract was executed, notice of 
cancellation was not given until July 31, 1991, no waiver was 
granted, and Meridian was damaged thereby. Decisions 
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regarding the hiring of faculty, the arrangement of 
classrooms, the purchase of books and materials, and the 
acceptance of other students, all occur based upon the number 
of enrollment contracts properly executed, as of July 1st of 
each school year. 
Accordingly, genuine issues of material fact do 
exist and the granting of Hughes' Motion for Summary Judgment 
was in error. 
II. The trial court's application of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure was an error as a matter of law because when 
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Meridian, 
any material difference in the parties version of the facts 
precludes summary judgment. 
This Court recently stated: 
...cross-motions may be viewed as involving a 
contention by each movant that no genuine 
issue of fact exists under theory it advances, 
but not as a concession that no dispute 
remains under the theory advanced by its 
adversary. c.e.q. DeStefano v. Oregon Mut 
Insurance Co., 762 P.2d 1123, 1124 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
...each cross-movant implicitly contends that 
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
but that if the court determines otherwise, 
factual disputes exist which preclude judgment 
as a matter of law in favor of the other side. 
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Wycalise v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 
821 (Utah App. 1989) . 
In the instant case, the pleadings together with the 
affidavits and exhibits show that Meridian could enforce their 
agreement if viewed in the light most favorable to Meridian. It 
was error for the trial court to have concluded otherwise. 
The standard of review has long been clearly stated in such 
cases as the instant case. In Holt v. Katsanevas, 854 P.2d 575 
(Utah App. 1993), this court stated: 
In considering an appeal of the grant or 
denial of a summary judgment, we review the 
facts and all reasonable inferences from them 
in a light most favorable to the losing party. 
Larsen v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 
1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991). 
In viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences from them 
in a light most favorable to Meridian, the trial court's order was 
in error. 
The trial court's ruling of August 26, 1993, (R. 171), was not 
correct in that: 
1. Material facts were in dispute; 
2. "A preponderance of evidence" was not the correct 
standard on a motion for summary judgment, and; 
3. A Finding that Hughes' interpretation of certain 
facts were reasonable was not appropriate under Rule 56(c) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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Accordingly, the trial court/s application of Rule 56 was in 
error as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully urges this court to reverse the Order 
granted below and remand the matter for trial. 
DATED this 27th day of April, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of the Appellant to David S. Sam, 889 N. Freedom Blvd., Suite 
102, Provo, UT 84604, postage prepaid, this "2.*? day of April, 
1994. 
Brian C. Harrison 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
B. Ruling of Circuit Court (August 26, 1993) 
C. The Meridian School Enrollment Contract 
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set aside must proffer some defense of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit to justify a trial on 
that issue Downey State Bank v Major-
Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976) 
—Setting aside proper. 
Where plaintiff served defendant with a 
summons, and left a copy with the defendant 
which was not the same as the original, the 
court had jurisdiction but sufficient confusion 
was created so that a motion to set aside the 
default judgment should have been granted 
and the defendant allowed to plead consistent 
with our declared policy that in case of uncer-
tainty, default judgments should be set aside to 
allow trial on the merits. Locke v Peterson, 3 
Utah 2d 415, 285 P.2d 1111 (1955). 
Default judgment and writ of garnishment 
were properly set aside where trial court failed 
to obtain jurisdiction over defendant because 
summons was not timely issued. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp v Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970) 
Where appellants, plaintiffs m a civil action, 
promptly objected to date set for trial on the 
ground that their counsel had an already 
scheduled appearance in another court on that 
date, but due to fact that there were no law or 
motion days between time objection was filed 
and trial date, objection was never heard, re-
fusal to set aside default judgment entered 
when appellants failed to appear on trial date 
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977) 
Time for appeal. 
Under former Rule 73(h) the time for appeal 
from a default judgment m a city court ran 
from the date of notice of entry of such judg-
ment, rather than from the date of judgment. 
Buckner v Mam Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 
124,288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Central Bank 
& Trust Co v. Jensen, supra, and Rule 58A(d)). 
Cited m Utah Sand & Gravel Prods Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
J.PW. Enters., Inc v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
(Utah 1979), Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason-
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah* Gra-
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y U. L. Rev. 937. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments 
§§ 1152 to 1213. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to lia-
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's nght to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
1255. 
Failure to give notice of application for de-
fault judgment where notice is required only 
by custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
Default judgments against the United States 
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 55 A.L.R Fed. 190. 
Key Numbers. — Judgment ** 92 to 134. 
Rule 56- Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is'sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings (and the evidence betore it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It1 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rale 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
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—Inconsistency with deposition. 
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FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
PROVO DEPARTMENT 
THE MERIDIAN SCHOOL, 
vs. 
BONITA HUGHES, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 920001847CV 
RULING 
This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss and plaintiffs counter 
motion for judgment. Therefore this matter has been submitted to the Court by way of 
affidavit and motions. 
While this matter is not before the Court following trial, nevertheless the burden on plaintiff 
is a preponderance of the evidence. I would suppose that this same burden is upon defendant 
in their Motion to Dismiss. 
The Court finds that there is not a material conflict of the facts, but that it is the 
interpretation of both parties of the conversations and other communications that gives rise to 
the conflict. 
The Court finds that the plaintiff has not met its burden and that the defendants interpretation 
of the communications are reasonable. Therefore the Court denies plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and grants defendants Motion for Dismissal. 
The plaintiffs civil complaint is hereby dismissed. 
DATED: August 26, 1993 
Circuit Court Judge 
- < JL 
THE MERIDIAN SCHOOL ENROLLMENT CONTRACT: 1991-1992 
t undersigned Parent/Guardian wishes to enroll the Student(s) listed in Part 1 below in the Meridian School (hereafter the School) 
the 1991-1992 academic year. The undersigned Parent/Guardian of the Student(s) agrees to pay the tuition payable and all fees 
i to accept the terms of enrollment set forth in this Enrollment Contract. 
Student Names and Tuition Amounts 
e table below summarizes tuition for the 1991-1992 academic year. The tuition in Grade 1 through 12 depends on the number of 
idents enrolled from a family. Nursery and Kindergarten Student(s) do not count in computing the multi-student discount. 
Nursery and Kindergarten 
$1,100 Nursery Threes 
$1,400 Nursery Fours 
$1,700 Kindergarten 
STUDENT'S FULL NAME 
1. Sarah Hughes 
Grades 1 Through 12 
$2,850 First student from family 
$2,500 Each 2nd and 3rd student 
$2,100 Each 4th and 5th student 
$1,800 Each subsequent student 
GRADE TUITION 
K 1700 
TOTAL TUITION $1700 
Enrollment Deposit 
) reserve a place for the Student(s) listed above Parent/Guardian must pay an immediate enrollment deposit of $100 per Student 
> to a maximum of $300 per family, which will be applied toward tuition. This deposit and any other tuition payments made prior 
July 1, 1991 will be refunded in full if this enrollment contract is cancelled prior to July 1, 1991, in writing, in accordance with 
e notice provisions of paragraph 9. 
Early Payment Discounts 
:> encourage early payment, the Meridian School offers early payment discounts for any and all payments received prior to August 
1991. The table below gives the discount rate applicable in each month. These rates are equivalent to 1.5% for each month prior 
August 1991 plus an additional 1% in February. 
Table of Early Payment Discounts 
(For payments received on or before date shown) 
FEB 7 MAR 7 APR 7 MAY 7 JUN 7 JUL 7 AUG 31 
.100 .075 .060 .045 .030 .015 .000 
. Schedule of Minimum Payments and Finance Carrying Cost 
X least one-fifth (20%) of total tuition payable is due in August and must be paid prior to August 31, 1991. No Student may 
latricufate until this payment has been received by the School. Any balance outstanding on August 31, 1991 will be billed in equal 
istallments plus a financing charge that is 1.5% of the balance outstanding at the stRrt of that month. The monthly statement will 
ive the minimum tuition payment required in that month, which is summarized in the table of minimum proportions of total tuition 
lat must be paid over time. If the minimum monthly payment is not received by the fifth of the month, a late fee of 3% of the 
unimum payment will be charged. 
AUG SEPT OCT 
.20 .30 .40 
NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APRIL 
.50 .60 .70 .80 .90 1.00 
brents may pay off the tuition at a faster rate than the minimum and will thereby reduce the amount of monthly financing charge. 
• • / ) • • 
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dditiori to tuition, Parent/Guardian agrees to pay all fees and charges billed by the School for textbooks, laboratory fees, special 
i trips, and student supplies. Tuition and fees that are not paid when due shall bear interest from their due date until paid, at the 
of 1.556 per month or fraction thereof. The School shall be entitled to recover all costs of collection, including court costs and 
onable attorney's fees. The School reserves the right (without prejudice to its rights to recover tuition and fees owed by the 
mt/Guardian) to deny any and all privileges of enrollment to the Studen(s) in the event of non-payment, including the withholding 
rogress reports and denial of access to classrooms and other facilities of the School. 
Contract Cancellation by Parent/Guardian 
School and Parent/Guardian jointly acknowledge that by this enrollment, the School has reserved a place for the Student(s) in 
listed grades for the entire school year and that the School will enroll other Students and formulate its budget in reliance on this 
ailment Contract. 
s Enrollment Contract may be cancelled bv providing written notice to the School on or before July 1. 1991 in accordance with 
notice provisions in Paragraph 9. This Enrollment Contract also may be cancelled by the Parent/Guardian during the school year 
le family of the Students) relocates to an area outside Utah County by providing written notice in accordance with the notice 
/isions of Paragraph 9. A pro rata share of tuition, but not fees, will be refunded to families who relocate. The basis for the pro 
return will be the proportion of days remaining in the school year to total days in the school year. In all cases, Other than 
ving out of Utah County and dismissal in accordance with the provisions in Paragraph 7, the obligation 
Parent/Guardian to pay tuition and fees for the entire school year is unconditional and irrevocable after 
y 1, 1991, and no portion of tuition and fees shall be refunded or abated for any reason. 
tules of Disciplinary Action 
snt/Guardian agrees to abide by and to have their Student(s) abide by the rules, regulations, and procedures established by the 
ool and published from time to time, including the Parent Handbook. The School reserves the right to dismiss and remove a 
lent from the School at any time if, in the judgment of the Head of School, a Student's industry, progress, conduct or influence 
r out of the School is not in keeping with these rules, regulations, and procedures. If the School dismisses or removes a Student 
n the School, a pro rata share of tuition, but not fees, will be refunded to the family of the Student. The basis for the pro rata 
m will be the proportion of days remaining in the school year to total days in the school year. 
Notices to Parent/Guardian from School 
s for tuition and fees shall be sent by first class mail to Parent/Guardian at the address listed below. Notice of school meetings 
1 be sent home by a designated Student from each family. Nodce of disciplinary actions shall be sent by registered mail to the 
ress listed below. 
Notice from Parent/Guardian to School 
ices of cancellation of this Enrollment Contract by Parent/Guardian shall be sent by registered mail to the Head of School, 
idian School, 931 East 300 North, Provo, Utah 84606. 
Nondiscriminatory practice 
School doe^lnr discriminate on tbc basis of n»<*J5, religion, gender, or national origin in the admissions, financial aid, or any 
a* program/^dtoinistered b><8ie School. 
-v1 <£-
mature: Head of School Signature of Parent/Guardian 
Name of Parent/Guardian (Print) 
Mailing Address 
$ \L'r r * " 7 / 
Amount Enclosed Date 
• * J v-f yj 112 
